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Chapter 10 
Protecting Children or Pandering to Politics? A Critical Analysis of 
Anti- Child Trafficking Discourse, Policy and Practice  
Neil Howard  
 
Introduction 
Though child labor had long been a focus of international attention, child trafficking began to 
emerge as the major child protection issue across the Majority World at the start of the last 
decade (Castle and Diarra 2003; Hashim 2003; Thorsen 2007; Huijsmans and Baker 2012; 
O’Connell Davidson 2011). This was no more apparent than in Benin, where two high-profile 
events saw child trafficking catapulted to the status of Number One social policy challenge. 
The first of these was the interception of a Nigerian trawler bringing? Beninese adolescents 
to work in Gabon. The second was the high-profile ‘rescue’ of Beninese teenage labor 
migrants working in the artisanal quarries of Abeokuta, Nigeria. Both episodes saw young 
workers identified as ‘slaves’, and both led to Benin’s being tarred as the new ‘epicenter’ of 
the international traffic in children (Feneyrol and Terre des Hommes 2005; Alber 2011; 
Morganti 2007, 2011; Howard 2011, 2012).  
 It was in this context that I first arrived in Benin, in 2005, as a young intern for a 
nationally-prominent Child Rights NGO. Throughout previously aware of Benin’s child 
‘trafficking problem’, my subsequent work with young labor migrants defined by child 
protection actors such as UNICEF as ‘trafficked’ quickly revealed the disjuncture between 
dominant representations of child trafficking and the lived realities of those migrants 
represented as trafficked. This disjuncture seemed paralleled in policy terms, as many early 
anti-child trafficking efforts focused on pre-emptively preventing youth labor migration, even 
as migrant youth labor migrants experienced their migration as un-problematic (Alber 2003, 
2011; Morganti 2011).  
2 
 
 It was in order to explore these tensions that I began my research in 2007. First, I 
wished to ascertain whether anti- child trafficking discourse and policy were really as 
problematic as they had initially appeared. Second, I wished to delve inside the anti-child 
trafficking field in order to understand why exactly this was the case.  For the purposes of 
this research, I defined ‘the anti-child trafficking field’ as all those institutional actors involved 
in the creation and spread of anti- child trafficking discourse and policy. These institutions 
included UNICEF and the ILO, from among the core UN agencies, the US Department of 
Labor and its Agency for International Development, Danish Aid, the EU and France, from 
the donor community, the Family and Justice Ministries, from within the Beninese 
government, and a collection of national and international NGOs. I decided that the most 
sensible strategy would be to conduct fieldwork which would allow me to access both those 
upon whom discourse and policy (attempt to) act and those responsible for the constitution 
of this discourse and policy. This meant working not only with young migrants (constructed 
by the anti- child trafficking and child protection community as ‘victims of trafficking’) and 
their communities, but also with discourse and policy-makers in each of the various 
institutions central to anti- child trafficking in Benin.  
 In terms of the former, I decided to examine what had been widely depicted within 
national and international media as one of the Benin’s most notorious examples of child 
trafficking - that of (mainly male) teenagers moving from the Zou region in the South of the 
country to the artisanal quarries of Abeokuta, Nigeria. In concert with my research assistant, 
who was from the Zou and had previously worked for an NGO engaged in the anti- child 
trafficking field, I selected four case study villages from the Zou ‘sending region’, and in 
these villages I purposively sampled current and former migrants to the quarries, those 
involved in the migrant labor network linking the region to the quarries, and village 
authorities. I chose these villages because they had experienced significant anti- child 
trafficking interventions and were known to my research assistant. This research took place 
over six months, between February and July 2010. It was later buttressed by a short period 
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of targeted fieldwork in February 2012, during which I spent time in and around the ‘receiving 
region’ of Abeokuta’s quarries, in Nigeria. This fieldwork involved (1) observing the living and 
working conditions in the quarries, and (2) interviewing 18 representatives of the key actors 
engaged in the quarry economy, including labor leaders, gravel purchasers, traders and 
transporters, landowners, and twenty Beninese adolescent migrant quarry-workers from 
villages across the Zou region, including two which formed my original case studies.  
 In terms of those responsible for discourse and policy - in other words, the anti- child 
trafficking field - I focused specifically on those bodies named above that are most active in 
forming and implementing anti- child trafficking policy in Benin and internationally. I identified 
these actors in a number of ways. First, I drew on my pre-existing contacts in the field and 
snowballed relevant information and interviewees across it. Second, I examined publicly 
available funding records to see which bodies provided funding for anti- child trafficking 
efforts. Third, I engaged in extensive participant observation with one UN agency and one 
significant international NGO active in the fileld, in order to further develop both an ‘insider’s 
perspective’ and an overview of precisely which bodies were important actors in the field. 
Importantly, I paid attention both to the internal and external dynamics of the relevant 
institutions, interviewing actors placed at different levels within each bureaucratic hierarchy. I 
interviewed over 100 anti- child trafficking actors. 
In total, I spent almost a year engaged with these institutions throughout 2009 and 2010. 
This included an extended period of participant observation in the Headquarters of one UN 
agency and in the Field Office of one major INGO. It also involved gathering a wide variety of 
relevant internal and published documentation and interviews with over 100 people at almost 
all levels of the institutional chain - ranging from donor politicians to local NGO staff active in 
my case study villages. 
 The rest of this paper is divided into three parts. In the first, I offer an overview of 
dominant anti- child trafficking discourse and policy as it manifests in Benin within the 
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institutional settings named above. In the second, I contrast the heavy anti-migratory 
emphasis prevalent in these with the empirics I have gathered with young labor migrants 
from Benin to Nigeria. In the paper’s third and final segment, I turn my lens inside the policy 
system in order to offer the beginnings of an account for why the difference between official 
narrative and ground-level experience manifests and persists.  This chapter captures the 
experiences of adolescents who engage in outmigration, circular and return migration, 
independently of the adult members of their families, as they transition from childhood to 
adulthood and their juxtaposition with local and global discourses of migration, mobility, 
trafficking and childhood.  
Discourse and Policy 
Discourse 
The nature of the dominant discourse around trafficking in Benin is well 
captured in the following Agence France Press article extract. 
Benin’s Child Slaves Working Nigeria’s Quarries 
Irenee, a skinny Beninese girl of 15, points to three mounds of earth: the 
graves of her friends who died of exhaustion here in the gravel quarries of 
Abeokuta, in south-western Nigeria.  
UNICEF says about 5,000 children from neighboring Benin are laboring here, 
eight hours a day, six days a week. 
In the sweltering heat and in the lashing rain, Irenee crushes chunks of 
granite rock, naked to the waist, her skin coated in a thick layer of grime. 
Failure to produce her quota, whatever the weather conditions, brings with it 
the risk of being beaten up. 
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In September 2003, when she was just 11, Irenee and 260 other children 
were freed by the Nigerian police and sent home, after a dispute between two 
rival trafficking gangs. But their parents sold them again to traffickers and they 
ended up back in Abeokuta, some 100 kilometers (62 miles) north of Lagos. 
The idea is that the child is sold into bonded labor for a fixed term - normally 
two or three years. At the end of the term he gets a bicycle and 100 or 200 
dollars (68 to 136 euros). If he completes three terms his master may build a 
new hut for the child’s family. 
Many of the families who sell their children into slavery are unapologetic. 
"How do you expect me to keep 37 children here when I have no income?" 
shrugged Luc Gbogbohoundada, an octogenarian with eight wives. 
Gbogbohoundada lives in Za-Kpota, a village across the border in Benin 
about 150 kilometres from Abeokuta. Za-Kpota is notorious as the child-
trafficking capital of the region. 
The land here can no longer support the huge families that have sprung up 
from generations of polygamous marriages. In spite of the children who bring 
home bicycles and money to smarten up huts Za’Kpota looks just as 
wretched as any other poor village. 
Child trafficking in Benin has risen sharply in the past few years. A law 
cracking down on the practice was voted in January 2006 but has never been 
promulgated. ‘Clearly, as long as this law is not put into practice, some 
villages carry on with this trafficking without fear,’ said Philipe Duhamelle, the 
head of UNICEF, the United Nations Children’s Fund, in Benin... UNICEF 
estimates that some 7,000 children from Benin are currently working in 
Nigeria after being sold. Of that number, 5,000 are estimated to be in the 
quarries of Abeokuta.  
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Statistics published in June by the Juvenile Protection Police of Cotonou 
indicate that more than 10,000 children destined to be sold outside the 
country are intercepted and turned back every year at Benin’s borders’.1     
This extract focuses on the work of Beninese ‘child slaves’ in Abeokuta. It features a number 
of characteristic tropes including the concept of ‘slavery’, the sale of children, and their 
violent exploitation at the workplace. It is notable that the piece draws on respected UN and 
police sources to build its narrative, and in doing so it reflects the way that the media, state 
and supra-state actors intertwine in their shared depiction of the migration-trafficking 
phenomenon in Benin. Significantly, as has been the case elsewhere, the labor migratory 
departure from the family home is cast here as somehow ‘pathological’, representing the 
consequence of un-willed, extraneous cause-factors such as poverty, criminal trickery, 
parental naivety or profligacy (Howard 2008, 2011, 2012; see also Hashim 2003; see 
Riisøen et al. 2004; O’Connell Davidson and Farrow 2007; De Lange 2007; Whitehead et al. 
2007; and Huijsmans and Baker 2012).  As the italicized text makes clear, the narrative of 
‘child sale’ permeates this piece. It is paralleled by the depiction of working conditions as 
brutal, exhausting and exploitative. Clearly, within this understanding, the Benin-Abeokuta 
migrant flow is a clear context of child trafficking, as is underlined by UNICEF’s 
spokesperson. This picture should be borne in mind when we return below to Abeokuta’s 
quarries.  
Policy 
In light of the prevailing discourse such as that documented above, it should come as little 
surprise that anti- child trafficking policy as pursued by the Beninese state and its 
international partners works fundamentally to protect  children by keeping them ‘at home’ 
and away from the ‘slavery-like’ work such as that depicted above The dominant line of force 
running across the Beninese anti- child trafficking spectrum is, therefore, firmly anti the 
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independent mobility of minors, with emphasis placed on ‘pre-emptive protection’ through 
sedentarization (see Howard 2012b and 2013 for a detailed discussion). 
 This can be illustrated most clearly by discussing the three major elements of the 
Beninese anti- child trafficking framework, as formulated and operationalized by the 
Beninese state, its partners and the donor agencies so central to their work. The first of 
these is the National Anti- Child Trafficking Law (LOI Nº 2006-04), the second is the 
Memorandum of Understanding with Nigeria regarding anti- child trafficking strategy, and the 
third are the widely-hailed ‘Village Anti- Child Trafficking Committees’. I will discuss each in 
turn. 
 Benin’s anti- child trafficking law is formally entitled the ‘Law Regulating the 
Movement of Minors and Suppressing the Traffic in Children’. Building on the ILO’s global 
anti- child labor framework, it defines children as all those under 18 and makes illegal all 
work seen to harm their ‘health, safety or morals’, including anything in sectors such as 
mining, quarrying, building, commercial agriculture or transport. As the law’s title suggests, 
however, it does not merely outlaw certain kinds of work or the ‘trafficking’ seen to equate 
therewith; rather, it also regulates the conditions under which minors may legally migrate. 
What does this regulation entail?  
 Article 7 establishes that children cannot legally be displaced within the borders of 
the country unless accompanied either by a direct parent or guardian or with the consent of 
a local government official. The law thus empowers state agents to directly implicate 
themselves in personal and familial labor mobility decisions. The law and its related decrees 
go on to explain that state consent for that (labor) mobility will only be forthcoming if a 
number of conditions are met. First, a family ‘placing’ a child must have all the child’s papers 
in order. Second, they must have enough money to pay for the child’s return. And third, they 
must be able to demonstrate that the child’s relocation is for the purpose of school 
attendance or for an official apprenticeship in a state-sanctioned sector, rather than work. 
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Article 4 establishes that relocation for labor ‘exploitation’ constitutes trafficking and is thus 
illegal, irrespective of any consent offered. When I asked Deg, a senior government official, 
whether this law could be considered a little heavy-handed, he replied that it was, but that 
that was its purpose, since ‘you cannot tell the difference between placement, movement 
and trafficking’ and thus you need ‘to ban it all’ (Interview, 10th March 2010). 
 Intricately related to the promulgation of the anti- child trafficking law was the signing 
and operationalizing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Benin and 
Nigeria. Phil, at the time Country Representative for one of the UN agencies central to 
Benin’s anti- child trafficking field, explained: 
Nigeria was a big issue for us, because we realized that Nigeria was the 
major destination for Beninese kids. We therefore needed to establish a 
partnership with them. Our agency convinced both governments to get 
together and have regular meetings on trafficking. We wanted to develop an 
MoU on the issue, which we eventually did... It is a very good document, 
stating the multi-level cooperation that is to take place between the countries, 
from police, to border officials to NAPTIP and the BPM.2 Each country also 
developed concrete joint and separate plans of action, including border 
sensitization... Ministers and our staff go to border villages in the Zou and tell 
people that the law has changed and that behavior must therefore also 
change [i.e. that child  (under 18 years) mobility must stop]. They tell people 
that there are severe punishments for transgression, including 25 years in jail 
if they are found accompanying any [non-kin] kids to Nigeria. Some people 
have in fact now been arrested’ (Interview, 9th November 2011). 
 Further interviews and documentary analysis confirm this picture. Indeed, one 
explained that the MoU is precisely about harmonizing institutional responses at the political 
level, providing support for the expansion of national border controls and persuading border 
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communities to desist from the teenage (labor) mobility that the discourse constructs as so 
problematic. 
 This is paralleled in the final component of Beninese anti- child trafficking policy to be 
discussed here - the Village Committees. These were developed shortly after trafficking 
exploded as an issue in Benin by UNICEF, a collection of donors and the Child and Family 
Ministry, to be the state’s arm at the village level (Interviews, 10th March 2010 and 7th April 
2010). Though state officials claim a wide variety of tasks performed, and goals worked for, 
by the village committees, interviews with their founders, with committee members in my 
case study villages, and myriad unpublished material including internal committee 
documentation and UN agency reports relating to their work suggest otherwise. Indeed, it 
seems that their major objective is to preemptively protect minors by thwarting their 
movement. For instance, an important, confidential UN document I obtained reveals that the 
emphasis in activities is squarely placed on ‘community surveillance [regarding movement]’ 
(p.3), while the consultant’s report into the work of the committees offered precisely the 
same conclusion, arguing that most of the work they do is ‘anti-movement’ (Botte and 
UNICEF 2015: 16). Such an assessment is echoed in one report documenting committee 
plans of action. In this publication, we learn that committee goals are to ‘watch over 
suspicious movements’, to ‘denounce and dissuade’, and to provide ‘social surveillance’ 
(MFPSS and UNICEF Benin 2006), all actions confirmed as important by committee 
members interviewed in my case study villages.  
Youth Labour Mobility 
In this section, I will contrast the dominant discursive and political paradigm around child 
trafficking in Benin with empirical data gathered from current and former youth labor 
migrants involved in what the Agence France Presse newspaper article identified as 
trafficking - the migrant labour of teenage boys from Za-Kpota to the artisanal gravel pits of 
Abeokuta, Nigeria. This section will dispute that claim. It will do so, first, by describing the 
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nature of life and work in Abeokuta’s gravel pits, as witnessed as part of my research and 
recounted to me by those working in this environment. Subsequently it will address the 
importance of money and social transition in the conscious choices young migrants make to 
move to Nigeria. Finally, the section will offer brief reflections on the alternative policies 
young migrants and their communities would like to see pursued instead of anti-child 
migratory efforts. 
Work in Abeokuta 
The Abeokutan quarry economy is a well organized social and economic world that is highly 
structured along class lines. First, absentee Nigerian landlords own and rent out patches of 
land rich in the gravel that is ideal for use in the construction industry. Second, female 
Nigerian gravel dealers lease this land from those landlords and have contracts with them 
which date back two or three generations. They have come together to form a gravel dealers 
union and contract with a third class - lorry owners/drivers, who themselves operate under 
the auspices of a union -  in order to have the extracted gravel transported to a fourth class, 
the gravel purchasers in Lagos. Gravel prices and prices for the services rendered by each 
of the links in this chain are predominantly set through negotiation between the unions 
representing these latter three classes. The gravel dealers also contract with a fifth group, 
however - Beninese ‘bosses’ who provide the (migrant) labor used to extract that gravel. 
These bosses are all men from Benin’s Zou region encompassing my case study ‘sending 
region’. They have themselves all worked six-year ‘apprenticeships’ under their own bosses 
until eventually they were ‘liberated’ and given freedom by the hierarchy of the Beninese 
expatriate community providing and managing the labor-force in Abeokuta to hire their own 
gangs of laborers, for whom the task is to work according to the directions of these bosses in 
extracting the gravel.  
 The teenage migrant laborers identified as ‘trafficked’ in the Agence France Presse 
piece and in anti- child trafficking documentation from my case study region are precisely the 
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young men who constitute these gangs of laborers. Each individual is hired on a two-year 
contract, and is expected to work six days a week for his patron, who in return houses, 
clothes and feeds the young worker and ultimately pays him 140,000 FCFA (about $250) or 
an equivalent sum in material terms (for instance a motorbike) on completion of the contract. 
The boys are free to work on their own account on their day off or when they have already 
loaded the lorry that is their day’s work for their boss.  
 Though the work is hard, they work in groups of three, with the biggest and strongest 
pick-axing the ground, the second biggest and strongest shoveling the gravel and the 
smallest sifting it through a filter. They rest when they need to, share the load of work 
between them and are often helped by the patron who is in many ways dependent on them. 
This dependence is not only intrinsic to the employer-employee relationship, however; it is 
also reflected in the fact that each patron relies on his reputation as a good employer in 
order to attract the laborers whose surplus he will ultimately extract, such that he has an 
interest in treating each of his charges sufficiently well that they will not tarnish his image 
when they return to Benin. 
Image 1: Teenagers Working in Abeokuta 
  
(Image Source: Author) 
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 It is notable that, of the 20 quarry-working adolescents I interviewed, only one 
claimed that his work was too difficult or that he had been lied to regarding the nature of the 
work he was to expect. This was Placide, who said that he had originally been told that he 
would be working in a shop in Nigeria, only to find later that he was to work in the quarries 
(Interview, 10th May 2010). For the majority, however, Jack’s experience and his 
assessment were representative. When I met him in Abeokuta, Jack was 15 years old. He is 
from a village on the border between Za-Kpota commune and the commune of Bohicon, in 
Benin. He came to Abeokuta a year before we met and planned to stay to work in the 
quarries for a further year, in order to complete the standard two-year contract. In return for 
his labor, he was to be bought a motorbike at the end of his two years, which was the price 
agreed between him, his parents and his patron. On top of this, Jack also worked in his free 
time and ‘on his own account’. He said that he was able to earn around 2000 Naira (about 
$12) every week by doing this. His relationship with his boss was also always very good – he 
was never mistreated, was ‘never shouted at’ and was consistently ‘well fed’.  
 Jack was saving his money week by week and aiming to return to Benin in order to 
set himself up in a trade. When I asked him why he came to Nigeria, he was very clear and 
explained simply that his goal was ‘to earn money’. ‘Work here is much better than it is at 
home’, he stated, because in Abeokuta he ‘can earn a lot and also keep’ what he earns. 
Though the work can be difficult, Jack contended, the fact that he earns makes it all 
worthwhile. He was also very clear that working on the family farm is much more physically 
demanding than work in the gravel pits, even though the former is legal while the latter is 
not. Jack stated that he strongly opposed any laws which say that young people such as him 
should not be able to migrate to Nigeria for this kind of work (Interview, 4th February 2012).  
‘We Move For the Money’ 
Though the trafficking discourse in Benin has predominantly constructed labor mobility to 
places like Abeokuta as an un-willed and highly exploitative experience, my research with 
13 
 
current and former teenage labor migrants to Abeokuta’s quarries suggests otherwise. For 
most migrants, as for their wider communities, the chance or need to access the money that 
is essential to any life project in Benin represents the major motivation for moving and 
mobility’s major justification. 
 This was underlined consistently across the interviews I conducted in Abeokuta and 
with those in Benin who have returned from Abeokuta. Zeze is an illustrative example of this 
(Interview, 2nd February 2012). Zeze is 17. He is from a village in the heartland of Benin’s 
Zou region and first came to Abeokuta with relatives after his parents passed away. This 
was when he was 11. Zeze has since completed two and is now finishing his third 
consecutive two-year labor contracts. After the first two years, he earned enough money to 
return and build himself a dwelling in his home village. His earnings from the second two 
years gave him enough money to equip that house. Now, with the money he earns from this 
third contract, he intends to buy a motorbike.  
 For Zeze, work in Abeoluta is not a challenge. ‘I grew up working in the fields’, he 
explained, which more than prepares you for the lesser rigors of life in the gravel pits. Since 
he will soon have performed the six years necessary to finish with his ‘apprenticeship’, he 
will soon be ‘free’ either to work entirely for himself and ‘on his own account’, or to hire other 
young laborers to work under him. His plan, however, is to return to Benin to see whether he 
can set himself up in business, although he is very frank that if he is unsuccessful, he will 
simply keep returning to Abeokuta to earn money. Money is, for Zeze, the single primary 
motivation for his work. When I asked him why people come to Abeokuta, ‘akwe’, or ‘money’, 
was his simple, one word answer. When I asked him what he made of the anti-migratory 
anti- child trafficking message, he was very disdainful. ‘If you want to make something of 





Relationships and Transitions 
Though earning money is crucial and underpins all labor migration to Abeokuta, we should 
not see that labor migration as a one-dimensional, money-only phenomenon. In my 
interviews with current or former youth labor migrants to the quarries, a number of other 
socially important factors emerged. One of these involved young males fulfilling their social 
responsibilities by providing for their families. This was underlined particularly clearly in the 
refrain, ‘I went to Abeokuta in order to put a roof on my father’s house’, as young migrants 
returned from their two-year contracts to give their fathers their money. 
 Individual social transitions, however, are also significant. These transitions can 
involve acquiring respect and status, or acquiring the material resources necessary to marry. 
In terms of social respect, it is significant that one of the major motifs I heard when reflecting 
with interviewees on the value of migration was that, if successful, it can offer the chance for 
an individual to become ‘considered’. To be ‘considered’ (or ‘known’) in this part of Southern 
Benin means to be well thought-of, respected, seen as an important or successful person. It 
is an essential goal for many people, and successful migration is a principal means of 
achieving it. Numerous interviewees in fact explained that returning from Abeokuta with 
material goods such as a motorbike, clothes or a generator represented evidence of an 
individual’s successful migration and thus constituted a material path to their being 
‘considered’ by those around them upon their return. 
 This is of course related to social manhood and to the marriage that this is seen to 
inevitably prefigure. My village interviews revealed that the understanding predominant in 
this region of when and how one transitions from the status of ‘boy’ or ‘youth’ to ‘man’ is 
neither fixed, nor universally attributed to biological age, but contingent upon the attainment 
of economic independence. In one group interview with a collection of adolescents in one of 
my Zou commune case study villages, for instance, an adolescent explained with the 
agreement of his peers that one is a man in his community when ‘he works and eats without 
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the help of his parents (Interview, 14th May 20110), while his assessment was echoed by a 
further young man, who declared that to be a man in his village is ‘to farm, to have a big 
harvest, and to be able to sell your crops’ (Interview, 10th May 2010). As many youth 
lamented to me, however, this transition and the related transition to marriage is now more 
difficult than ever. Where being self-sufficient through successfully farming lots of land had, 
historically, been the major indicator that one was a ‘man’, with declining soil fertility, the 
decreasing size of landholdings as a result of titling and population growth, and the 
increasing importance of the monetized economy, more and more teenage boys are finding 
their path to the material independence that underpins one’s status as a man – and thus as 
a potential husband – blocked. In Sommers’ (2012) terms, these youth are ‘stuck’ (2012), 
and thus need new strategies for self-articulation. Crucially, as is increasingly the case 
across the region (Thorsen 2007; De Lange 2007; Imorou 2008), it is often independent 
labor migration which represents their go-to strategy. 
What Should Be Done? 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the kinds of policies that young migrants and their communities 
would like to see deployed in an effort to ‘protect’ them or to improve their living conditions 
differ radically from those adopted as part of dominant anti- child trafficking strategy. Indeed, 
when I asked people what they would want to see, two clear trends emerged in the 
responses I received. The first can be summarized as the provision of economic alternatives 
to labor migration. ‘Give us jobs’, ‘promote development’, ‘bring industry here’, ‘pay us more 
for our crops’, ‘give us what you have’ and ‘train us in skills’ were all refrains I heard. The 
second major trend was similarly widespread and is summarized in the phrase ‘improve our 
working conditions’. Since very few see quarry work as exploitative, it is extremely rare to 
find anyone who would like to see that work illegalized. At best, people desire improved 
labor relations, with ‘pay us more wages’ representing the central demand. Importantly, 
since these alternatives are not pursued as part of mainstream anti- child trafficking strategy, 
the young migrants I interviewed and their communities admitted that they treat anti- child 
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trafficking initiatives as little more than an obstacle to be navigated, like any ordinary border 
guard. The dominant village analysis of anti- child trafficking strategy (and, by implication, its 
success) can thus be summarized in the following exchange I had with two elder women in 
one of my case study villages: 
Neil: What do you think of the message that young people shouldn’t leave the 
village?  
Woman 1: Those who tell us this are those who hold back the development 
of the village! It is a terrible message! And they give us nothing in return. They 
come here but they bring nothing with them! 
Neil: Why do NGOs and the government do this and say these things?  
Woman 2: They don’t want people to leave the village because they don’t 
want to see us go and develop elsewhere instead of here. That’s fair enough, 
but their words are useless to us, because they bring us nothing’. (Interview, 
28th April 2010) 
Why The Divergence? 
The contrast between the ground-level realities of the youth labor migrants I have 
researched and the official anti- child trafficking discourse and policy as presented above 
could not be more apparent. In light of this, the question which necessarily poses itself, and 
which my research has largely been designed to answer, is why? What factors prevent the 
anti-child trafficking field from better representing and responding to phenomena such as the 
labor migration of young males to Nigeria? Which forces underpin this state of affairs? In this 
section, the chapter will draw on data gathered from inside the anti-child trafficking system in 




Lack of Understanding 
At the most basic, yet highly significant, level, my data suggest that a major factor explaining 
the divergence between the world of discourse and policy and the world of youth labor 
migration in Benin is the sheer lack of understanding predominating within the former. In this 
regard, it should be noted that in my Beninese ‘sending communities’, I was applauded for 
being the first person ever to ask villagers how they understood the labor migration that has 
so often been depicted as trafficking. When I related this experience to the more senior 
Benin-based anti- child trafficking actors I subsequently interviewed, in particular those in 
head offices in Cotonou, none were surprised, as none had ever visited their ‘field sites’.  
 This is paralleled by the insignificant role that detailed qualitative research seems to 
play in the formation of discourse and policy. Abidi1, for instance, is a UN employee who was 
central to the early evolution of the anti- child trafficking field in Benin. When I questioned 
him on the information gap and the role of research, he declared: ‘We didn’t have to work too 
hard to have a good idea of what was going on before establishing our interventions in 
Benin’ (Interview, 12th January 2010). Mitch and Yaya, who have  responsibility for 
designing and implementing researcg projects at the headquarters of their UN agency, 
explained similarly with reference to their organization’s work on trafficking: ‘With 
mining/quarrying kids, it doesn’t matter if they’ve been trafficked or not, we know they 
shouldn’t be there, so we just take them out before research even begins’ (Interview, 3rd 
June 2009). Likewise, when I asked Carl, a senior figure responsible for donor relations and 
project financing for a UN agency, whether research plays a role in his organization’s project 
and policy work, he simply replied, ‘It never really happens that way. This isn’t a ground-up 
thing’ (Interview, 9th June 2009). Similarly with Martin, an international NGO employee who 
used to occupy a senior position within the donor hierarchy of one powerful donor 
government, I had the following exchange: 
                                                             
1 All names have been changed to protect the identity of research participants. 
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Neil: Did your new approach take a long while to develop? 
Martin: Yes. Most people don’t have an in-depth understanding of what we’re 
dealing with. There’s a lack of conceptual clarity as well as information 
sharing. There are huge battles between various organizations over 
intelligence. We need a better understanding across the board and we need 
some coordination in what we do. 
Neil: Do people have on-the-ground understandings? 
Martin: No. Zero. There is a major problem, data-wise, with where people get 
their information in this field. Look at the example of the Global Report on 
Human Trafficking. It’s awful but people believe it because “the UN says so”.’ 
(Interview, 8th June 2009) 
 What this informational gap leads to is a perpetuation of received understandings. 
Anti- child trafficking discourse and anti- child trafficking policy tend to feed on themselves, 
failing to break the cycle of misinformation with genuine empirics. 
The Politics of Silence 
The lack of ground-level understanding that I experienced in my fieldwork is not, however, 
the whole story. Indeed, my interviews, participant observation and documentary analysis 
suggest that other serious factors plague this field. The first is what I term the politics of 
silence. What do I mean by this? In Benin, though poverty is frequently decried as the 
underlying ‘cause’ of child trafficking (see, for instance, MFE and ILO 2008:13), engagement 
with what causes that poverty is almost non-existent. Indeed, in all my work and research 
with(in) Benin’s anti-child trafficking field, never have I come across any single instance of an 
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individual or an agency addressing or even mentioning the political economic causation of 
poverty2. Why the silence? 
 Sometimes this silence is self-imposed. When I asked one UN employee working at 
organizational headquarters and with ample responsibility, for instance, whether she had the 
freedom to speak out over things like EU trade tariffs or US cotton subsidies (which studies 
suggest affect Beninese peasant income in areas such as those in which I conducted my 
research; OXFAM 2002, Minot and Daniels 2005, Sumner 2007) she said, after a long 
pause: 
Look, it depends. Generally speaking, of course you can say what you want, 
but you’ll be blasted left and right and bullied by countries if you do. Some 
people criticize us for not being critical enough...but we take a long-term view 
because we don’t want to endanger longer-term collaboration and 
cooperation with the states. (Interview, 24th September 2009) 
Another UN employee said: 
In our agency, you have to be diplomatic. Often that’s just an organizational 
culture thing, where there isn’t always even any direct political pressure. It 
can often just be staff over-compensating and trying not to alienate states by 
saying things they think they won’t want to hear. (Interview, 6th June 2009) 
 Sometimes, however, this silence is imposed from above. As part of my research, I 
interviewed various people within the US Trafficking in Persons hierarchy and I asked them 
whether they, at the top of the anti-child trafficking tree, could bring issues like subsidies into 
the trafficking debate, given the understanding that trafficking is caused by poverty and 
poverty in Benin is arguably related to Minority World subsidies. These were two of the 
responses I received: 
                                                             
2 For a truly classic example of the failure to engage in any political economic thinking, see the representative ILO 
and Beninese Child and Family Ministry ‘National Child Trafficking Study’ (MFE and ILO 2008). 
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No way could I mention this! We’re constrained by US interests and that 
means we’re restricted to corridor discussions. (Interview, 29th October 2009) 
Listen, I can try and raise this in our meetings, but the chances of success or 
of public discussion are slim-to-none, because there are very big interests to 
fight. (Interview, 16th September 2009) 
 Even more telling were the words of two EU officials I spoke to in Benin’s de facto 
capital, Cotonou. We had previously discussed political economy and had even privately 
reflected on the role that EU or US policies play in perpetuating global conditions of poverty. 
I therefore asked whether they could consider including, if not in their policies, then at least 
in their discourse, mention of things like subsidies. These were their responses: 
We can take account of the effects of these things at ground level - people 
being poor in Benin and such. But we can’t talk about the top level. Our last 
reference is the national level, the Beninese government. The Westerners 
who work here know that their policies cause poverty and trafficking. Many of 
them would even like to change it, but they can’t. (Interview, 17th February 
2010) 
We simply cannot talk about this, Neil. This is a national structure, it’s a 
national delegation. We structurally cannot go beyond borders. If we want to 
do something like this regarding EU or US subsidies, we need to have a 
formal political position sent down to us from Brussels. Otherwise we can’t 
mention it. (Interview, 2nd April 2010) 
The Politics of Representation 
The politics of silence ties in to what I argue is the overarching and highly problematic 
politics of representation. What do I mean by this? As has been documented in a number of 
similar contexts (Olivier de Sardan 1998, 2008; Lecomte and Naudet 2000;  Easterley 2002; 
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Bierschenk 2008), most of the agencies active in the anti- child trafficking field depend on 
funding for their operations, be that from donor governments, international bodies or 
multilateral institutions. This funding is almost always conditional upon recipients being able 
to report on ‘successes’, to demonstrate ‘outputs’, and to show that limited resources have 
been well spent. It is also conditional upon recipients refraining from stepping outside of the 
boundaries of what it is acceptable to their donors for them to say or do. Thus, as Alexia, an 
INGO operative working in Benin, explained to me: ‘Neil, in child protection, you have to be 
fashionable to attract funding’ (Interview, 2nd September 2007). Or, in the words of Nina, a 
UN agency employee who had worked on trafficking projects for the better part of a decade: 
‘It’s all about being “sexy”, trafficking is sexy, so trafficking is the way we have to go. Plus, 
you must remember that suffering sells in Africa’ (Interview, 28th May 2009). 
 Instead of engaging the political economy of poverty-causation as part of anti- child 
trafficking discourse- and policy-making, and instead of addressing the murky reality that 
working conditions might be poor, but better than nothing, institutions involved in this field 
must necessarily reproduce the simplistic stories featured in the newspaper article above 
and the reductive projects which focus attention on ‘slavery’, since nothing else will be 
politically acceptable. 
 Moreover, since donor pressure to produce representable ‘outputs’ is severe, anti- 
child trafficking actors must perpetuate problematic policies and simplistic narratives even 
when they aware of their problems, simply because ‘the money needs to get spent’. Indeed, 
should they stop doing so, donor money - and with it their jobs, livelihoods, and the wages 
on which their families depend - will dry up. As one former OSCE Special Representative on 
Trafficking  tellingly admitted:  
The reality [in this field] is that not much happens; people just produce papers  
- they cut and paste, cut and paste, cut and paste. Or, it’s seminar, seminar, 
seminar, conference. We have to do something to justify our money. 
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Otherwise, the gravy-train will stop rolling. (Interview, 23rd September 2009; 
emphasis added) 
In like fashion, Martin, himself a former donor government employee, complained:  
The problem is that [we] have to demonstrate results and this creates issues 
for project work. The results-driven framework is one of the reasons why 
there are so many conferences and workshops - people have to do 
something to show some form of tangible outcome. (Interview, 8th June 2009) 
Conclusion 
The research underpinning this paper began with a desire to explore the tension between 
representation and reality when it came to ‘child trafficking’ in Benin. It expanded to examine 
the anti-child trafficking field itself and sought to use this examination to formulate 
explanations for the existence and persistence of this tension. The data now presented offer 
clear insights into that tension and into what underpins it. 
 First, as was initially suspected, the data suggest that anti- child trafficking discourse 
and policy are indeed fundamentally flawed. Where, in the case of discourse, the language 
of ‘slavery’, ‘coercion’ and ‘abuse’ is current, for those young migrant laborers putatively 
identified as ‘victims’ of coercion or abuse, labor migration to places like Abeokuta seems to 
represent a conscious, purposive response to life’s immediate circumstances. Anti-child 
trafficking discourse would appear, therefore, to be intrinsically reductive and 
misrepresentative. 
 What of policy? While its major emphasis lies in pre-emptively protecting those young 
migrants who, upon migration, are assumed to inevitably end up in situations of exploitation 
and trafficking, little evidence suggests that this is appropriate with respect to the cases 
represented in my research. Indeed, among the current or former young labor migrants 
documented here, only one was tricked and the rest either consented to or sought out their 
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migrant labor opportunities. What this implies of course is that a policy predicated on 
preventing them from accessing those opportunities through migration runs directly contrary 
to their interests as they perceive them. 
 Why this disjuncture? The latter third of this paper has advanced two major 
explanatory hypotheses. The first is that many actors in the anti-child trafficking field (and 
thus constituting the major part of anti- child trafficking discourse and policy) remain so 
divorced from ground-level empirics that they formulate discourse and policy on the 
shoddiest of empirical foundations. They therefore often reproduce received ideas without 
critical empirical challenge. 
 The second hypothesis is, perhaps, even more troubling. It points to a deeply anti-
political core at the heart of the anti-child trafficking field. As has also been made painfully 
clear by the literature on the politics of development and the ethnography of aid (Shore and 
Wright 1997, Lecomte and Naudet 2000, Mosse 2005, Mosse and Lewis 2005) it suggests 
that discourse and policy are molded more by the contours of donor desire and financial 
pressure than by the interests of those vulnerable migrants whose welfare nominally justifies 
their existence. Pandering to politics, therefore, seems to trump protecting young people. 




2 The Nigerian Anti-trafficking Agency and Benin’s special child police unit, the Brigade de 
Protection des Mineurs. 
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